RNA - The charge that Doha has been aiding Ansarullah resistance fighters in Yemen is particularly interesting given that Qatari soldiers have been participating in, and suffering on behalf of, the US-backed, Saudi-led military coalition. This is a fast-developing story, but certain core elements of it appear to have taken shape:
1) It is hard to avoid connecting Monday’s events with revelations about the hacking of Yousef al-Otaiba’s personal email. The leaked emails show that Otaiba, the UAE ambassador to the US, has been lobbying the Trump administration to break America’s long-standing alliance with Qatar. The leaked emails suggest that Otaiba has had a close, ongoing relationship with the pro-Israel think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, including collaboration on anti-Qatar policymaking.
2) The Saudi-led split with Qatar might seem inconvenient, not just for Qatar but for the United States. America’s largest military base in the region is in Qatar, and the Pentagon and the State Department have both made clear they support Qatar, and expect this incident to blow over pretty quickly. The US relationship with Qatar is an important part of their regional policy. President Trump says nothing to suggest he is even aware of that fact, and it’s virtually unheard of for the US to speak ill of any country that’s hosting a US military base of any import.
3) That huge base is a big part of the US effort to dominate the region on the pretext of ISIL war, and some analysts are warning this could be a huge problem for the US war effort that Qatar is suddenly being vilified by its Arab neighbors, suggesting Qatar’s lack of hostility toward Iran, another thing the Saudis are complaining about, might ultimately push them further toward Iran.
4) The bigger problem is that the Saudis might expect the US to go along with their attempts to isolate Qatar, and get really mad at the US when they ultimately don’t, because it would get in the way of the war. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has doubted this. Since the main US priorities in the region are keeping the war going and selling weapons to the Saudis, anything that doesn’t threaten either of those goals is likely to be ignored.
5) The situation has gone a bit out of control and in many ways goes back to the Arab Spring uprisings earlier in the decade, and the Qatari state media’s general support for the big protest movements calling for democratic reforms in Bahrain and Egypt. That didn’t sit well with the more dictator-friendly nations in the Persian Gulf, or particularly Bahrain, who had a bloody crackdown of its own going on.
6) In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won big in the elections and Qatar was eager to line up and set up ties with that nation. The Arab despots, not so much. Riyadh in particular saw free elections as a major threat to the House of Saud, and considered the Muslim Brotherhood virtually a terrorist organization after it grabbed power in Cairo, arguing that the same scenario might repeat in Riyadh. Egypt’s democratic government quickly fell to a military coup, and Saudi Arabia and the rest of the PGCC backed the new junta.
7) The resentment surrounding Qatar has lingered, however, and whenever their state media starts broadcasting something a little too far outside of the Saudi comfort zone. The most recent case quoted the Qatari Emir warning against a military confrontation against Iran and the Resistance Front, which infuriated all the PGCC states salivating for a new sectarian war, and quickly spiraled out of control.
There are other elephants in this room as well:
- The crisis has roots in President Trump’s recent visit to Riyadh. During his trip, Trump fully embraced the Saudis’ anti-Iran, anti-resistance view of the region, and that support has emboldened the Saudis to take a harder line against Arab states that deviate from their foreign policy targets: political Islam and Iran.
- Qatar has played an active role supporting and arming terrorist groups in Syria, including the Al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front and even ISIL, and this gave them the upper hand in leading the war of militancy against Damascus. Three years into the Syrian crisis, the Saudis could eventually transfer the leading role to Riyadh, but tensions remained in place in the ties between the two Arab neighboring states who see themselves as PGCC heavyweights. However, in April, Qatar was reportedly behind a negotiated settlement to evacuate four besieged Syrian towns, a deal Doha reportedly reached through negotiations with Iran. Qatar’s cordial relationship with Iran is one of Riyadh’s chief grievances.
- Qatar has also supported Palestinian Hamas, whose biggest foreign patron has consistently been Iran. And with the Saudis coming together with Israel over their shared hostility toward Iran, Riyadh would certainly not have viewed that support for Hamas favorably. So the spat is a distraction. The Israelis are desperate to make the Palestinians subordinate to their plans, including Judaizing Jerusalem, and Hamas is the main hurdle. They are desperate to hide their covert support for terrorist groups in Syria. The spat offers the opportunity for both. It will distract the attention of Muslim nations from other key issues in the region, while helping the US move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem Al-Quds.
- Russia, Iran and Qatar are ranked the first, second and third biggest holders of natural gas reserves in the world, and together boast more than half of the global total. Major gas exporters have met informally for several years at the annual Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), a grouping including Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia and Libya. Iran wants to turn it into a more formal body akin to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, the 13-member group which makes output decisions that can sway oil prices while Qatar is not a member. It is clear that any tensions with other GECF members could jeopardize the future prospects of Qatar in this important organization.
In any case, it will be difficult for the Saudis and others to completely isolate Qatar internationally. The Qataris have good relations with several international and regional powers, including Iran, Russia, and the European Union. If things really get rough, Doha will be pushed towards Tehran both economically and politically. The Saudis are working to their own loss.
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