RNA - The Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot has reported that the Israeli deputy army chief also met with the Turkish Chief of General Staff General Kholousy Acar. The spokesman for the Israeli army has confirmed that the Arab armies' chiefs have met the IDF deputy chief. Tel Aviv has a set of security cooperation with the Arab countries including with Saudi Arabia in Yemen war, with Bahrain against the revolting Bahraini people, and with Jordan and Egypt against the Palestinians.
The Arab world once under rule of its revolutionary leaders was pressing ahead with its anti-Israeli doctrine in a series of Arab capitals like Cairo, Tripoli, Baghdad, and Damascus, and stood firmly on the front lines of anti-Tel Aviv multiple battles. But in past few decades, due to internal and external factors, it lost the potentials to play its earlier role and began seeking ways to set up a diplomatic normalization process with the Israeli regime.
In fact, looking back at the record of the Israeli-Arab wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 shows that the Arab countries during these decades adopted a security and military approach in dealing with the Israeli regime and its presence in their vicinity. They all mobilized their forces against Tel Aviv during the wars. But these anti-Israeli stances gradually winded down in passiveness, and in the current conditions they are turning into friendly relations working against interests of some other nations in the region. In fact, whenever the popular demands turned into a threat against the rule of Arab kings and rulers or the dictatorship sought to repress the popular demands, they moved to collaboration with the Israeli regime. Actually, a series of common opportunities and threats push the Arab countries to cooperate with Tel Aviv in military and security fields:
Threats
- Internal crises
One of the key concerns of the Arab regimes that persuades them to hold military and intelligence relations with the Israeli regime is existence of domestic crises that have busied and dampened their capabilities. Multiple crises, noticeably the legitimacy crisis, which stirred discontent and protests in the Arab world have sent the Arab leaders to working with Tel Aviv to tackle the popular potentials.
- Regional chaos
Another threat that made the Arab world obsessed and led to domino-style collapse of authoritarian Arab governments is the expansion of chaos and crisis across the region. It poses a major and existential threat to the despotic Arab regimes. Military and intelligence weaknesses that lead to a failure to maintain the crisis convinces the Arab regimes to head to the Israeli regime for military and intelligence partnership to make up for their shortcomings in the region and in the face of their uprising nations.
Opportunities
- Containing Iran
One of the key drives of the Arab governments, topped by Saudi Arabia, to open diplomatic, intelligence, and military channels with Tel Aviv is to take on Iran’s power in West Asian regional order. Especially after the 9/11 attacks and invasion and occupation of Iraq, the opportunity was ripe for Iran to get toehold in the Arab world. Such a situation pressed the Arabs toward struggles to contain Tehran, launching projects to promote Shiitephobia and Iranophobia.
- Role playing in US West Asian strategy
Along with expansion of the American Middle Eastern strategy, particularly expansion of NATO to West Asia, the grounds are prepared for the Arab countries and the Israeli regimes to normalize and boost relations. Meanwhile, the US pressures on the Arab countries to start economic, military, and intelligence relations with the Israeli regime have paved the way for these Arab states to play a more active role in the US' regional strategy. This issue will make them take advantage of cooperation with Washington, in addition to benefiting from the Israeli helps to curb the internal and regional crises they are grappling with.
A combination of these threats and opportunities– and let's add the economic interests– causes the Arab governments to step toward bolstering relations with the Israeli regime in an apparent shift of doctrine. Further boost of ties with Tel Aviv in the upcoming years will provide grounds for the two sides to consider official normalization of ties in the future.
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